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"Representation", "imitation" and "mirroring" have proved 
to be insufficient translations of the concept of mimesis. 
Walter Benjamin's notion of "mimetic potential" offers a 
different view on the qualities of mimesis. Benjamin 
stresses the importance of language and its mediality to 
mimesis; for him language is the "höchste Stufe des 
mimetischen Verhaltens und das vollkommenste Archiv 
der unsinnlichen Ähnlichkeit" (Benjamin 1991, Bd. II/1, 
213) He considers mimesis on the level of linguistic 
mediality. 
In the following I will try to outline the mimetic potential 
of metaphors in literary texts which focus on their linguistic 
mediality. As Paul Ricoeur suggests, "the possibility that 
metaphorical discourse says something about reality 
collides with the apparent constitution of poetic discourse, 
which seems to be essentially non-referential and centred 
on itself. To this non-referential conception of poetic 
discourse I oppose the idea that the suspension of literal 
reference is the condition for the release of a power of 
second-degree reference which is properly poetic 
reference. Thus, to use an expression borrowed from 
Jakobson, one must not speak only of split sense but of 
'split reference' as well." (Ricoeur 1977, 6) 
Differing from Ricoeur's speculative and hermeneutically 
orientated conception I will concentrate on the formal 
aspects of metaphors, especially regarding the question 
wether or not there is any sort of resemblance between the 
form of metaphors and the objects they signify. It follows 
out of this that my re-definition of mimesis and metaphor 
will not focus on the relation between mythos and mimesis 
predominant in Ricoeur. On the contrary I shall concen-
trate on the world-creating aspects of metaphor which are 
said to arise from the mimetic potential of language (in 
Benjamin's ideal sense). 
Despite this I will try to rethink the Benjaminian concep-
tion of "ideal language" in a more appropriate analytical 
way, using central ideas of the approach to a theory of 
symbols that Nelson Goodman suggested in his "Lan-
guages of Art" (Goodman 1976). Goodman states that 
metaphor involves the transfer of a schema (and the labels 
within that schema) between disjoint realms. (A schema 
applied to a realm makes up a system.) In metaphor a 
familiar scheme is implicitely applied to a new realm or to 
its old realm in a new way. Typically, the result is novel 
organization of the realm, for the metaphorical scheme 
classifies together objects in the realm that are not 
classified together by any literal scheme. (Goodman/Elgin 
1988, 16) But let us challenge this Goodmanian theory of 
metaphor. We must keep in mind as a presupposition: 
Goodman states that resemblance between two objects A 
and B is no necessary or sufficient condition for represen-
tation in the sense that A represents B. An object 
resembles itself to a maximum degree but rarely repre-
sents itself. A must be a symbol for B, which means: stand 
for it, refer to it, as far as the matter of representation is 
concerned. According to this view denotation is at the very 
core of representation and is independent of resemblance. 
This denial of resemblance brings with it that the kind and 
the direction of the transfer of the schema are arbitrary: 
almost anything may stand for anything else, even and 
especially in the case of metaphor. According to Goodman 
even pictorial systems of signs lack the category of 
resemblance to some degree and against our intuitions. 
These intuitions derive primarily from the argument of 
natural language systems and pictorial symbol-systems 
having different perception conditions. While the words of 
a natural language must be learned through teaching and 
one cannot decide which signs are related to which objects 
when confronted with an unknown foreign language, the 
perception of pictorial systems is almost anthropologically 
universal. Leaving aside the question wether this is true or 
not we could try to imagine and put forth the crucial 
assumption: Is there any relation between the signs and 
the signified objects that is beyond convention and 
arbitrariness? Goodmans answer for representation as a 
whole is devastating; any hope for so called realistic 
features vanishes: "Realistic representation [...] depends 
not upon imitation or illusion or information but upon 
inculcation. [...] If representation is a matter of choice and 
correctness a matter of information, realism is a matter of 
habit." (Goodman 1976, 38) In the case of metaphor, 
however, one answer of the radical nominalist Goodman 
can be isolated that is a bit astonishing. In compliance with 
his nomialism Goodman states that in metaphor a schema 
can be transferred almost anywhere; this transfer is bound 
only to cultural, historical, i.e. conventional decisions and 
settings. "The choice of territory for invasion is arbitrary", 
as Goodman writes, "but" – and I think that is very crucial – 
"the operation within that territory is almost never 
completely so." (Goodman 1976, 74) Goodman continues 
with his example of the "deliberate application of tem-
perature predicates to sounds or hues or personalities or 
to degrees of nearness to a correct answer; but which 
elements in the chosen realm are warm, or are warmer 
than others, is then very largely determinate. Even where a 
schema is imposed upon a most unlikely and uncongenial 
realm, antecedent practice channels the application of 
labels." (Goodman 1976, 74) It seems that Goodman 
leaves behind the concept of resemblance and turns to 
some kind of analogically structured relation between the 
label order within the transferred schema and the objects 
in the new realm. Admittedly the term analogy does not 
seem to play an important role in Goodman's "Languages 
of Art". But maybe the concept named with that term could 
be clarifying in the process of comprehending the 
phenomenon of metaphor. Let us turn back to the 
difference between pictorial symbol systems and the 
symbol systems of natural languages. One argument for 
the resemblance between pictures and what they 
represent is that we can – cum grano salis – understand 
new pictures while on the contrary we cannot understand 
new words for example in a foreign language. This 
assumption conflicts with the second one, which proves 
pictorial realism to be a matter of inculcation, according to 
which view pictures – like words – do not resemble their 
referents at all. I think Robert Schwartz (Schwartz 1997, 
166–168) has outlined an interesting solution for this 
dilemma. He argues in the following manner: "Consider a 
system like standard Western music notation. Given only a 
suitable sampling of written notes (symbols) and taught to 
correlate them with sounds (referents), we might very well 
learn how the system works, 'how to go on.' Getting the 
idea of how the system works enables us to handle new 
symbols in the system not included among the teaching 
samples. Schwartz is not talking here about new combina-
tions of previously learned notes, but of understanding 




new, hitherto unheard individual notes. And this kind of 
learning can occur, it would seem, without our ever 
receiving explicit instruction concerning the structure of 
musical notation. Yet there is no reason to suppose that 
the written notes 'look like' or resemble the sounds they 
denote. Again, resemblance between symbol and referent 
seems hardly to play a role. Indeed, we can find examples 
of this sort of inductive semantic learning in natural 
language, too." The ability to understand brand new 
metaphors is one of the examples Schwartz gives for 
inductive learning: Our habits associated with the literal 
use of the word put sufficient constraints on metaphorical 
use that we can frequently intuit the semantic import of the 
metaphor the first time around, without being taught it 
specifically. Systematic correlation of the set of symbols 
with their referents does not depend in any obvious way on 
resemblance. This lack of resemblance entails that the 
system at use in metaphorical transfer is conventional. But 
Schwartz discriminates further: "Still, the symbols within a 
given system may not be arbitrary with respect to the other 
symbols in the system, for there may be sufficient 
regularity among the symbols, regularity in how they 
denote or describe, so that learning to use some provides 
adequate evidence for interpreting other members of the 
set." Words of natural languages in their literal use are 
relative to each other, while within metaphorical use the 
labels within the transferred schemas gain some system-
atic regularity among each other. This regularity, of course, 
is not a priori or non-conventional. The point is that, given 
the way the system works, with the correlations that have 
been established (and do exist), we can learn the semantic 
force of some members of the system through learning the 
semantics of others. Thus, arbitrariness is not a question 
of conventionality, but more a question of induction and 
learning. We see the assignment of symbol to referent as 
arbitrary when we can discover no pattern that enables us 
to project the semantic import of the symbol from knowl-
edge of other symbols in the system. A symbol can be 
arbitrary then in the sense that it is a matter of convention 
or choice or not an a priori necessity that it denotes what it 
does, but this differs from saying that its interpretation is 
arbitrary in relation to the other symbols in the system. It 
does not in any way follow that if symbols do not resemble 
their referents, the symbols need be arbitrary in relation to 
each other in the way ordinary words such as 'cat,' 'shoe,' 
and 'ink' are.  
But for further discussion it seems clarifying to turn to a 
conception which is at the very core of Goodman's 
"Languages of Art": exemplification which is regarded as a 
central mode of symbolizing in the arts. Goodman defines 
exemplification (Goodman 1976, 52–57) as a subclass of 
the converse of denotation: a label (or in the case of 
language: a predicate) denotes an object, and, roughly 
spoken, the denoted object exemplifies that label or 
predicate. The difference between denotation and 
exemplification is a matter of direction. Exemplification, 
however, coincides not with the converse of denotation but 
with a proper subclass of that converse: the subclass 
consisting of those cases in which what is denoted or 
posseses refers back as a sample to what denotes or is 
possessed. Exemplification is possession plus reference. 
Goodman gives the example of small swatches of cloth in 
a tailor's booklet. These function as samples, as symbols 
exemplifying certain properties. But a swatch does not 
exemplify all its properties. Goodman's concept of 
exemplication looks quite plausible when dealing with 
material objects, as they are individual and perceptible. 
The swatches in the tailor's book are signs which share 
their material and perceptible properties with the objects 
which they signify. In this case a naive conception of 
mimesis could be diagnosed: due to the material proper-
ties that it posseses and to which it refers the sample 
imitates the labels or predicates which denote that sample. 
But Goodman applies exemplification even to pictorial 
systems of signs – in conflict with his repudiation of 
resemblance between sign and object that I quoted above. 
Goodman goes even further and says that any predicate 
instantiation in a natural language may exemplify not only 
its perceptible properties but its syntactical and semantical 
classification features as well. Which predicates denote an 
instantiation of a predicate in natural languages? Not only 
those which focus on the perceptual qualities of the 
instantiation and not only those which focus on its 
syntactical classification features but also those which 
focus on its semantical classication features. In the light of 
the no-resemblance theory of representation this seems 
rather hard to swallow: Goodman's use of exemplification 
in that broad sense seems to be overstressing and 
weakening the concept of exemplification. Is this concept 
of exemplification coherent with a nominalistic, extensional 
view which tries to dispense with intensions? I am inclined 
to say no. And I think Monroe C. Beardsley has uttered a 
critique similar to mine, concentrating on pictorial systems 
of signs (Beardsley 1997, 43–66) – but let us look at 
Goodman's answer: "First he [i.e. Beardsley] is quite right 
in calling me to account for misapplying the term 'exempli-
fication' in certain cases that amount only to instantiation. 
To say a picture is of a certain kind – say a Churchill-
picture or a centaur-picture – is not to say that the picture 
exemplifies but only that it instantiates a label for, or 
possesses the property of being such a picture." (Good-
man 1997, 68) 
But, so my hypothesis: Would it not be possible to speak 
of self-exemplification in the case of many metaphors in 
poetry? Could it not be that these metaphors possess the 
quality of being metaphors and refer to their metaphorical 
status? In this way metaphors could turn out to be an 
exemplification of some linguistic potential inherent to 
natural languages (cf. Kants concept of hypotyposis). And 
could that kind of poetic reference (cf. Ricoeur's "split 
reference") not be characterized as mimesis based on 
linguistic mediality, on a mimesis without perceptual 
resemblance (and so meet the Benjaminian require-
ments)?  
Currently it seems to me that two different types of 
mimesis should be assumed: one in any case of metaphor 
which I would like to call schema mimesis and one which 
occurs when poetry reflects upon its own linguistic 
mediality, which I would like to call self-referential mimesis 
or exemplificational mimesis. 
The question to be put to schema mimesis: if metaphor 
provides a novel organization of the realm, to which it is 
applied – as the metaphorical scheme classifies together 
objects in the realm that are not classified together by any 
literal scheme – then: are that realm and the objects and 
their properties completely unstructured before being 
metaphorically represented? Or could one suppose that 
this realm must have some intrinsic order of objects and 
properties that resembles the order of the labels within the 
scheme transferred to it? In the latter case metaphor would 
expose something about the objects and the properties of 
the realm and therefore be a mimetic act. (I wonder if this 
has anything to do with diagrammatic iconicity.) 
The question to be put to selfreferential mimesis: Would 
it not be possible to repudiate the answer of Goodman to 
Beardsley (cf. above) in the cases of some poetry that 
deals with ist own linguistic mediality? And would it not be 
possible to return to Goodman's original concept that some 




utterances in a natural language may possess the property 
of being utterances of that type and refer to that posses-
sion? If yes, that would mean that these utterances 
exemplify their own linguistic mediality. In case of 
metaphors – and NB: we are in the field of poetry – one 
instantiation exemplifies metaphor as a whole. And if we 
take seriously Walter Benjamin's myth of an ideal 
language that evolves in poetry, then this exemplification 
could turn out to be a case of mimesis of the world in a 
self-referential way as supposed by radical constructivism. 
This modern, formally orientated reading of the concept of 
mimesis would perfectly match the Aristotelian definition of 
mimesis: not the result of a work of art but the process of 
world creation, natural or artistic, must resemble nature. It 
would, furthermore, match the Platonic definition of 
philosophical mimesis, which is self-referential and differs 
in that regard from poetical mimesis which is in Platon's 
view based upon an ordinary subject-object-relation. 
What does this renewed conception of mimesis mean for 
a concept of metaphor, especially for metaphor in 
science? In Western science we see a historical shift 
toward the belief that analogy rather than generalized 
metaphor provides a basis for scientific inquiry. (Gent-
ner/Jeziorsky 1993, 477) Despite this I tend to follow 
Thomas S. Kuhn's view that metaphors are fundamental to 
science, providing on occasions "an irreplaceable part of 
the linguistic machinery of a scientific theory," playing a 
role that is "constitutive of the theories they express, rather 
than merely exegetical". (Kuhn 1993, 538) This could imply 
that knowledge in science is strongly related to the 
linguistic means by which scientific theories are formu-
lated. And this could further imply that poetry which refers 
to its own linguistic mediality could turn out to be a crucial 
sceptical challenge to knowledge based theories in 
science. "Und das", to speak with Rainer Maria Rilke, "ist 
viel." 
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